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The purpose of research discussion papers is to make research findings available to researchers and the public
before they are available in profession journals.  Consequently, they are not peer reviewed. Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets
In the past fifty years state trading enterprises (STEs) have waxed and waned in world
food grain markets. State trading enterprises grew markedly in importance in the 1950s and
1960s and by the early 1970s, controlled around 90 percent of wheat imports and the vast
majority of rice imports. Over the past ten years there has been a marked decline in the role that
state trading enterprises play in these markets. Interest in state trading has been sparked by
debate over their impacts on world markets and the possibility that further disciplines on state
trading enterprises will be forthcoming through the World Trade Organization (WTO). The
current U.S. position is that state trading is an important issue for further negotiation in the
agricultural round scheduled to begin November 30, 1999, in Seattle. The U.S. submission to the
WTO in preparation for the upcoming round states that members should agree that further
disciplines are needed on the import activities of state trading enterprises (United States Trade
Representative 1998), although no details are given on what these disciplines should be. Another
motivation for interest in state trading enterprises is the application for accession to the WTO of
countries that use STEs extensively, such as China and several other countries whose economies
are in transition. 
The history, prevalence, and reform of wheat and rice state trading enterprises are
investigated in this paper. The historical context of state trading enterprises and the domestic
policy goals that originally motivated government control over imports are discussed. The degree
and nature of the reform that has occurred to date is then presented. An analysis of the
development and reform of state trading enterprises is then used to assess the probability and
likely avenues of further reform of state trading in world wheat and rice markets. Earlier work by
Abbott and Young (1999) has investigated the impact of state trading importers on the world
wheat market and that topic will not be addressed here.
Definition of State Trading Enterprises
There is a diversity of public institutions throughout the world that in one way or another
control or influence agricultural trade (Kostecki 1982; Sorenson 1991; Dixit and Josling 1997).
Kostecki defines state trading enterprises as agencies that control the essential terms of trade for
imports, namely price and quantity. This definition recognizes that state trading enterprises can
take a wide variety of institutional forms. For purposes of examining the consequences of STEs 2 Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 
on wheat trade behavior, an STE is defined as (1) an agency that has the exclusive right to import
grain, whether or not it uses private firms to physically handle the grain, or (2) a government
agency that coexists with private firms but engages in grain trade, making decisions about the
quantity, quality, price, and source of wheat imports. Veeman, Fulton, and Larue (1999) provide
a useful discussion of the issues in defining state trading. 
Historical Prevalence of State Trading by Wheat and Rice Importers
Because of their importance in world food grain markets, the focus of this paper is on the
wheat and rice markets. Table 1 provides a comparison of world production and trade in wheat
and rice in 1961 and 1997. Production and trade of both wheat and rice has increased greatly
since 1961. Production and trade of wheat more than doubled between 1961 and 1997; however,
the ratio of trade to production remained constant at about 20 percent. In that time period,
production of rice increased from 147 million metric tons (mmts) to 380 mmts, and trade
increased more than threefold. Rice trade as a percent of production increased from 4.3 to 5.8
percent, indicating the persistence of thinness as a characteristic of the rice market. 
Table 1.  Production and Trade of Wheat and Rice, 1961 and 1997
(1,000 metric tons)
Year Production Trade 
Trade as %
of Production
Wheat 1961 220,049  46,039 20
1997 578,436 111,424 19
Rice 1961 147,300   6,412 4.3
1997 380,293   22,186 5.8
Source:  Economic Research Service. 1999. Production, Supply, and Demand (PS&D) View. 
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.
In the 1960s and 1970s, state trading by wheat and rice importers accounted for a high
percentage of traded volume. Schmitz et al. (1981) estimated that during the period 1973–1977,
91.3 percent of wheat imports were conducted by countries using STEs. Falcon and Monke
(1979–1980) used surveys by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations to
estimate the degree and nature of government intervention in the rice market and found thatPrevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 3 
nontariff barriers affected 93 percent of imports and that trade volume was government
determined for the vast majority of importing countries.
A number of circumstances surround a nation’s decision to implement government
control of wheat and rice imports. In many cases, particularly in Asia, state trading was part of a
package of policies adopted in the years after World War II when many countries achieved their
independence. Some of the countries undertook land reform (for example, in Japan, South Korea,
and India), which was accompanied by a massive reorganization of agricultural production.
Many developing countries followed a program of import substitution, which relied on cheap
food policies to spur industrialization (Bruton 1998). “In general, policies as related to
agriculture involved heavy state intervention in the provisions of inputs, procurement and
pricing, land reform, significant levels of public investment and a general subservience of
agriculture to industry in the early stages of industrialization” (Stein 1995, p. 9). Trade policies,
including state trading, are established to support domestic agricultural policies. A brief
description follows of the context of the agricultural policies of India, South Korea, Indonesia,
and Brazil, as well as some general comments on the development of state trading in Africa, will
be used to illustrate the concerns and circumstances leading to the adoption of government
control of imports through state trading enterprises. 
India 
India had a long history of food shortages, including the Bengal famine of 1943, by the
time it achieved independence in 1947 (Bhatia 1991). Policies to increase food production were
not implemented until 1951 when India entered a period of greater government involvement in
economic planning. In 1956 the United States and India signed the first agreement under U.S.
Public Law 480 (PL 480), which provided for the importation of 3.1 mmt of wheat and 0.19 mmt
of rice. 
 PL 480 was a program developed in the United States in the mid-1950s to reduce the
surplus of agricultural commodities through the sale of U.S. commodities for foreign currency
(Cochrane and Ryan 1976). Before that time, surplus U.S. agricultural commodities were
absorbed by Marshall Plan aid and the Korean War (Gupta 1998). PL 480 sales were attractive to
the government of India, as it allowed them to save foreign exchange for imports of industrial
goods necessary for an industry-led development strategy. PL 480 imports assisted in keeping 4 Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 
food costs, and thus wages, low for urban workers, another component of India’s
industrialization strategy. However, over time the government of India realized that imports of
cheap food were detrimental to the development of the agricultural sector and, in addition,
caused political difficulties. 
Although imports from the United States never reached more than 15 percent of
domestic output, the public distribution system became almost entirely dependent on PL
480 wheat. President Johnson further complicated the political situation by putting wheat
on a “short tether.” India was required to submit its food needs every month, and the
President himself cleared the shipment of food aid, depending on India’s progress in
implementing ‘reform’ in agricultural and fiscal policy....After the war with Pakistan in
October 1965, food aid was suspended until Indira Gandhi made the politically fraught
decision of devaluing the currency in June 1966....Those who disagreed over whether
industry or agriculture would be given top priority in development plans were expressing
differences about the quickest path to self-sufficiency and sovereignty....The perception
of Indian leaders and policymakers that Johnson had humiliated them only strengthened
their desire to see rapid increases in food output, so that the nation would no longer be
dependent on food aid. (Gupta 1998, pp. 60–61) 
Food security and food self-sufficiency have been expressed goals of the Indian government
since that time and have been achieved by a variety of subsidies to producers and consumers and
by insulation from the world market through tariffs and government control of imports. 
South Korea
In South Korea, some elements of the story are similar. The U.S. military government
took over from the Japanese government in 1945. At that time, the U.S. military government
restored a free market for food, discontinuing policies of the previous government controlling the
grain market (Ban, Moon, and Perkins 1982). Food prices escalated when controls were dropped
and demand outpaced supply due to the repatriation of refugees. At that point, a low-price policy
for grains was implemented by the government. In 1955 Korea signed an agreement with the
U.S. for imports of wheat (and, to a much lesser extent, barley) under the PL 480 food program.
In 1960 U.S. policy for PL 480 sales was changed to a cash sales basis, and imports became
dependent on the country’s foreign exchange reserves. Nonetheless, increasing dependence on
imports resulted in the decline of South Korean's food self-sufficiency from 99 percent in 1960 toPrevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 5 
76 percent in 1971. The South Korean government reconsidered agricultural policy in the late
1960s and early 1970s in light of the cost of imports, declining food self-sufficiency, and rising
rural and urban income disparity. In 1968, a two-price policy for grain was implemented. The
government purchased grains at prices to support the income of agricultural producers, while
continuing its policy of low-priced food for urban consumers (Stein 1995). The difference
between the purchase price and delivery price of grain was subsidized by government deficits.
These agricultural policies required control over imports.
Indonesia
Indonesia has a long history of rice imports, which began in the late 1800s. Van der Eng
(1996) states that the foundation of contemporary rice policies began in the 1930s and 1940s
under colonial rule. The Dutch colonial government established the Food Supply Board
(Voedingsmiddelenfonds-VMF) to implement domestic policies to stabilize rice prices in the
country through the rice mills. The Food Supply Board became a government monopoly
importer of rice. Van der Eng argues that self-sufficiency became an important motivation
guiding policy with the beginning of World War II. Another concern influencing policy was
control over foreign exchange used for rice imports. 
Brazil
Import substitution played a significant role in the development strategies of Brazil, as in
many other Latin American countries. The paradigm of import substitution was often
implemented through government administration of the allocation of foreign exchange,
government controlled prices for a broad range of commodities, and the establishment of public
enterprises. In Brazil, the postwar role of agriculture was to produce cheap food to assist in
industrial growth (Brandão and Carvalho 1991). The government of Brazil was extremely
concerned with providing cheap food to  urban residents. To accomplish their objectives, the
government controlled the marketing of agricultural commodities, prices, and imports and
exports. Various institutions were used to implement these policies, and their names and powers
changed over time. Between 1965 and 1991, the government was the sole importer of wheat.
Africa 
 World Bank analysts (1994, p. 21) argue that African policies must be understood in the
context of the conditions existing after independence. They explain that dependence on the state 6 Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 
occurred because of a lack of domestic capital and entrepreneurs, an unwillingness to rely on
foreign capital, and an underlying distrust of the market. In Africa, early marketing boards were
put into place by colonial governments to regulate small African growers in order to protect
larger European farmers against competition (Knudson and Nash 1990; Duncan and Jones 1993).
“After independence, the boards were retained by governments who wanted to control all aspects
of production and marketing, and especially to discriminate against certain ethnic groups that
were active in trading” (Knudson and Nash 1990, p. 52). Marketing boards were charged with
stabilizing domestic prices, and to do so, controlled the imports of agricultural commodities,
including rice and wheat. Bruton (1998) argues that import substitution was less important as a
development philosophy to African nations, many of which achieved their independence from
colonial powers in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Forces Motivating the Adoption of State Trading Enterprises 
These cases were chosen to illustrate the common threads between countries as well as
the diversity of circumstances and goals that motivated governments to adopt state trading to
control imports. State trading is commonly one element of a package of agricultural policies
adopted by the government. In many cases goals include cheap and stable food prices for
consumers, particularly those in urban areas (Abbott and Young 1999).
Food security is one reason why many governments have chosen to control imports and
to intervene in their agricultural sector (Timmer 1989; Meerman 1997). Many governments of
countries with recent experience of food shortages and famine have made food security a
priority, with implications for the design of their agricultural policies. Import substitution
strategies with associated government involvement in the agricultural sector was an important
factor for many countries. Circumstances imposed by outside governments also played a role,
such as the abrupt change in policy by the U.S. government in the conditions of PL 480 food
shipments to South Korea and India.  In many cases STEs were adopted after World War II when
newly independent national governments were involved in formulating their overall national and
agricultural policies. In a few cases, such as Indonesia and some countries in Africa, state boards
were inherited from the colonial governments. Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 7 
Reform of State Trading Enterprises
Many governments have eliminated their state trading enterprises or reformed them by
allowing private traders to import wheat as well. Most reform occurred after 1989, although
South Korea, Mexico, and the Philippines were early reformers in the mid-1980s. A list of wheat
and rice importers who used state trading is provided in Table 2. The fifty-three wheat importers
listed accounted for 73 percent of the wheat imported in 1996. Around 40 million metric tons
(mmt) of wheat was imported by countries that are identified as having either STEs with a
monopoly on wheat imports or STEs that heavily influence the domestic wheat market. This is a
marked decline from the 91.3 percent share of wheat imports by countries using STEs in the
1973–1977 period as estimated by Schmitz et al. (1981). 
For rice, the thirty-seven importers listed account for 75 percent of rice traded in 1997. In
1997, 7.8 mmt of rice was imported by countries in which the government has monopoly control
of rice imports, accounting for about 35 percent of traded rice. However, of that 7.8 mmt,
Indonesia accounted for 4 mmt and is in the process of changing its institutional arrangements
for rice imports. Without Indonesia, the share of world rice imports accounted for by state
trading importers declines to 16 percent of the market, a drastic structural change since Falcon
and Monke evaluated the market in the 1970s. These estimates do not include countries using
state trading who enter the market as both importers and exporters of rice, such as China, Egypt,
and India. However, China, Egypt and India imported only 763,000 mt/year on average over the
past ten years, a small percentage of the market. 
A selection of African countries, and whether they maintained state control over imports
of rice and wheat, is listed in Table 3. (Insufficient data was available for inclusion in Table 2).
The World Bank (1994) documents at least 14 public monopolies for wheat imports and 17
monopolies for rice imports. The World Bank supported many of these state trading enterprises 
in the late 1960s and 1970s, offering assistance through project loans to address deficiencies of
infrastructure and management (Operations Evaluation Department 1990). -----------------------------------------  Wheat ----------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------ Rice ------------------------------------------------
Country
Wheat STE name











Algeria OIAC Yes ---
Bangladesh FCM Coexist 1992 Ministry of Agriculture Coexist 1991





Bolivia P.L. 480 Executive Secretariate (coexist) No — — --- ---
Brazil CTRIN (eliminated) No 1991 unknown No 1990/91
China COFCO Yes --- COFCO (government monopoly, some private deals) Yes ---
Colombia IDEMA (eliminated)(price bands) No 1992 Columbian Agri. Trade Agy.  (Change from govt. STE to government
limits on and distribution of  import licenses for private trade)
Coexist some reform
1992
Costa Rica none No --- eliminated import licenses and quantitative restrictions No 1994
Cuba unknown Yes --- Alimport, Ministry of Foreign Trade Yes ---
Cyprus Cyprus Grain Commission Yes --- --- — ---
Dominican
Republic
— — --- Government limits import licenses Coexist ---
Ecuador Ministry of Industry (private trade,  price band) No 1991 ENAC (private trade, price band) No 1990
Egypt GASC (coexist, but govt. main importer) No 1992 GASC (reduced export controls) Coexist 1992
Eur.  Union (Quotas, TRQ and reference price system) ***
Ghana 1992 National Procurement Agency
(eliminated)
No 1992 National Procurement Agency Coexist 1993/94
Honduras — — --- none known (price band) No ---
Hong Kong none No --- none (quota, importers required to hold stocks) No ---
India Food Corporation of India Yes — Food Corporation of India (partial liberalization low-quality imports) Coexist 1997
Indonesia Badan Urusan Logistik (under reform) Yes 1998/99 Badan Urusan Logistik (under reform) Yes 1998/99
Table 2.  Institutions Involved in Wheat and Rice Imports-----------------------------------------  Wheat ----------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------ Rice ------------------------------------------------
Country
Wheat STE name











Iran unknown Yes --- Government of Iran No 1992
Iraq Government of Iraq (purchase only from UN) Yes ---
Israel Government Trade Administration (eliminated) No 1989 — — ---
Ivory Coast — — --- Caisse General de Perequation et Prix No 1994/97
Japan MAFF Yes --- Food Agency Yes ---
Jordan Ministry of Supply (coexist) 94-96 No 1996 Ministry of Supply (government imports security stocks) No 1997
Kenya none No --- Gov’t. National Cereals and Produce Board Yes ---
Libya unknown Yes --- — — ---
Malaysia none No --- BERNAS (Paderas Nacional Berhad; now a private agency with
monopoly import rights sheltered privatization)
Yes ---
Mauritius none No --- State Trading Corp. Coexist ---
Mexico CONASUPO No 1992 CONASUPO No 1985
Morocco ONICL No 1997 ONICIL No 1997
Nicaragua none known (price band) No ---
Nigeria unknown (eliminated; previous import ban) No 1996 none (previous import band) No  1995
North Korea unknown Yes --- Government of North Korea Yes ---
Norway Statkorn (privatized) No 1995 — — ---
Pakistan MFAC (coexist; govt. policies limit imports) No 1991 Rice Export Corporation Coexist 1989
Peru ENCISA (coexist; no import licenses) No March
1991
ENCASA (surcharges and price band) No 1991
Philippines  National Food Authority  No 1986 National Food Authority (quantitative restrictions) Yes ---
Poland Agencja Rynku Rolnego (coexist) No June 1990 — — ---
Romania Romecereal (eliminated) No June 1995 — — --------------------------------------------  Wheat ----------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------ Rice ------------------------------------------------
Country
Wheat STE name













Roskhleboproduct (privatized; imports heavily
controlled by Plant Quarantine Service)





GSFMO Yes --- none --- ---
Senegal — — --- Caisse General de Perequation et Prix No 1995
Singapore none No --- none (importers required to hold stocks) No ---
Slovakia KOOSPOL (coexist; govt. tender to allocate
import licenses)
No 1990 — — ---
South Africa Wheat Board Yes Oct. 1997 — — ---
South Korea  KOFMIA No 1983 Supply Administration of Korea Yes ---
Sri Lanka Cooperative Wholesale Establishment Yes --- Food Commissioner (licenses private companies) No 1990
Syria (exports controlled by HOBBOB) Yes --- GEZA (Foreign Trade Organization for Chemicals and
Foodstuffs)
coexist 1994
Sudan unknown Yes — — — ---
Taiwan TFMA No Jan. 1994 Provincial Food Bureau — ---
Tajikistan Ministry of Grain Products Yes --- — — ---
Tunisia Office des Cereales Yes --- — — ---
Turkey Turkish Grain Board (coexist) No --- none (government holds security stocks) No ---
Uzbekistan Uzmarkazimpex for Uzkhleboproduckt Yes --- — — ---
Venezuela CORPOMERCADEO No 1989 Price band — ---
Yemen Ministry of Trade and Supply (coexist) No ---

























Mali  Reformed by 1992
Mozambique  Reformed by 1992
Niger
Senegal
Tanzania Reformed by 1992
Togo Reformed by 1992
Zimbabwe
Burkina Faso
Cameroon Reformed by 1992
Congo Reformed by 1992
Côte d’Ivoire Reformed by 1992
The Gambia Reformed by 1992
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau Reformed by 1992
Kenya Reformed by 1992
Mali Reformed by 1992
Mauritania Reformed by 1992
Mozambique Reformed by 1992
Niger
Senegal
Sierra Leone Reformed by 1992
Tanzania Reformed by 1992
Togo Reformed by 1992
Zimbabwe Reformed by 1992
Source: World Bank. 1994. Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead.
A World Bank Policy Research Report. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Note: This 1994 report classified countries by the existence of a public or private monopoly
on imports and indicated if they had reformed by 1992. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the geographical dispersion of reform. Reform is concentrated
in Africa and Latin America, as many countries in Asia have maintained their STEs. The factors









Figure 2.  Institutional Status of Rice Imports and Exports 14 Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 
Reasons for Reform
Although the circumstances differ by country, a major impetus for reform has been
structural adjustment programs undertaken by countries with the World Bank in the late 1980s
and throughout the 1990s. At that time, interest in regional free trade agreements, including the
development of Mercosur and the revitalization of the Andean Group, may have provided
additional impetus for the removal of border institutions (Hufbauer and Schott 1994). For
example, both structural adjustment programs and negotiations over the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have played a role in allowing private traders to import wheat into
Mexico. Countries in Eastern Europe, such as Poland, eliminated or changed their STEs as part
of the economic adjustment to radical changes in governance that occurred in 1991 with the
breakup of the Soviet Union. However, lack of data on the policies of many Eastern European
governments has made it impossible to analyze this transition in any detail. Structural adjustment
loans administered by the World Bank were also critical in the reform of many of the state
trading enterprises.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, worsening terms of trade and rising real interest rates
contributed to severe balance of payments problems for many developing countries. In response,
the World Bank initiated a new program of structural adjustment loans (SALs) to support
recipient countries’ balance of payments (Jayarajah and Branson 1995). These loans were
conditional on the recipient government implementing a broad package of fiscal and monetary
reforms. Although World Bank loans had always contained elements of conditionality, SALs
differed in that they divorced program lending from specific items of investments. The World
Bank initiated SALs so that funds could be disbursed more quickly in response to destabilizing
macroeconomic shocks (Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye 1991). This contrasted with World Bank
activities in the 1960s and 1970s, which were characterized by project-based lending, often for
infrastructure projects. In 1976–1980, investment lending accounted for 95 percent of World
Bank loan commitments, and 5 percent was devoted to adjustment lending. By fiscal year 1991,
adjustment lending had increased to 26 percent of World Bank loan commitments (Jayarajah and
Branson 1995).Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 15 
1Stein (1995, p. 22) provides a list of countries in Africa that underwent structural adjustment programs
with the World Bank. He groups them into early adjusters (1980–1984) and late adjusters (1985–1987). Early
adjusters include Kenya, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Senegal, Mauritius, Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, Zimbabwe,
Guinea-Bissau, Zambia, and Sierra Leone. Late adjusters include Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Gambia, Guinea, Somalia, Zaire, Congo, Niger, Sao Tome, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
SALs were targeted to correct macroeconomic imbalances by adjusting exchange rates
and interest rates and reducing unsustainable current account deficits and government
expenditures. Some SALs had specific conditions for reform in the agricultural sector, and 27
percent included conditions for reform of trade policy (Jayarajah and Branson 1995). 
Sectoral (as opposed to structural) adjustment loans were initiated to address sectoral
issues and to focus on microeconomic adjustment, and many sectoral adjustment loans were
targeted at the agricultural sector. Throughout the 1980s the World Bank implemented
agricultural sectoral reform within the paradigm of heavy government involvement in agriculture
that was present in most of these countries (Meerman 1997). Loans would commonly be tied to
policy reforms such as the linkage of domestic prices with world prices, elimination of subsidies,
and changes to increase the efficiency of public enterprises. Lack of sustained success in these
reforms led the World Bank to change its philosophy regarding agricultural sector reform. In the
early 1990s, the bank rejected the previous model of operating within the constraints of heavy
government involvement in agriculture and “went to market” with a series of reforms to
drastically reduce the role of the state in agriculture. World Bank agricultural sector adjustment
loans generally include (1) elimination of price controls, (2) development of competitive local
markets for inputs, (3) reduction of state intervention in international trade, (4) improvement of
the regulatory system, and (5) privatization of inefficient public enterprises.
A list of countries that received either structural adjustment loans or agricultural sector
adjustment operation loans (AGSECALs) is presented in Table 4.
1 This list includes countries
that reformed their wheat or rice state trading enterprises and that, in addition, were listed as
recipients of World Bank SALs or AGSECALs at close to the same time. It does not include all
relevant cases as a complete dataset has been difficult to obtain.  16 Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 
Table 4. Selected Countries Receiving World Bank Structural Adjustment and


































































* Indicates pipeline projects. 
Sources: Meerman (1997); Jayarajah and Branson (1995). 
Outcome of Reform  
Considerable variation exists in the outcome of reform of STEs. In some cases the STEs
have lost their monopoly power to import grain but continue to exist with substantial diversity in
roles and influence. For example, in Egypt, the reformed STE continues to account forPrevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 17 
approximately 70 percent of wheat imports. Some STEs have been completely eliminated, such
as in Israel and Brazil;  in other countries STEs continue to perform some functions but have
completely lost their role as wheat importers, such as in Mexico and Colombia. Norway and
Russia have wheat STEs that were privatized and now operate with varying degrees of
continuing government involvement. In at least three cases, Brazil, Taiwan, and South Korea, the
wheat import function is now performed by flour millers associations, usually a small number of
millers with potential domestic market power. 
Recently, Malaysia has undertaken “sheltered privatization” of its rice state trading
enterprise, Paderas Nacional Berhad (Bernas). Bernas has now been incorporated, and although it
is no longer a state-owned enterprise, it must follow guidelines set by the Malaysian Cabinet.
Private traders have the right to import rice through Bernas for a fee (Hoh 1998). In the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), South Korea and Japan were granted a waiver from
the obligation to remove quotas on rice. In return for this special treatment, both countries agreed
to a minium market access provision and an explicit import quota. Both countries are obligated
to import an increasing percentage of their domestic consumption (Choi, Sumner and Song 1998;
IATRC 1994).
Although many governments have eliminated their state trading enterprises, they continue
to implement a wide variety of policies to influence trade and stocks. Hong Kong and Singapore
require rice importers to hold stocks. Colombia eliminated its state trading enterprise but now
controls imports of rice through import licenses (Restrepo 1998). Several Latin American
countries have implemented price bands for a variety of food imports, at times including wheat
and rice (USTR 1997). Finally, although the government of Pakistan allows private traders to
import rice, domestic prices are so low due to a variety of government policies that there is
seldom economic incentive to import. Knudson and Nash (1990) argue that the problem with
partial reform is that the private sector is unwilling, or unable, to compete with a subsidized
government state trading enterprise. 
Prospects for Further Reform
Further reduction of state trading in world grain imports could occur through three
avenues: (1) unilateral reform by countries of domestic and trade agricultural policies, including 18 Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 
elimination of state control of imports; (2) elimination of state trading as a part of a World Bank
structural adjustment program; and (3) increased disciplines negotiated in a multilateral context
through the World Trade Organization. 
Various factors make it difficult for countries to reform their policies unilaterally. For
some countries food security remains a concern (McCalla 1994). The URAA has raised concerns
about an increase in the level and variability of agricultural market prices and associated
implications for food security among developing countries (Economic Research Service 1998).
Concerns over food security are not limited to low-income developing countries—they have also
been raised by developed countries such as Japan. 
Although Japan remains apprehensive about food security, many other circumstances
have changed since the beginning of its postwar agricultural policy. As is true for many
developed countries, in Japan there has been a shift from subsidization of consumers to
subsidization of producers (Honma and Hayami 1985). The interests vested in the continuation of
current agricultural policies make reform difficult. For this reason, reform usually occurs when
either macroeconomic or agricultural policies become unworkable or result in a financial crises
(World Bank 1997; Williamson 1994). These circumstances often necessitate World Bank
involvement. Further reform in other countries may be instigated by structural adjustment loans
offered by the World Bank. Such reform is most likely to occur in lower-income countries and is
unlikely in Japan.
Many of the countries maintaining STEs for rice and wheat are either WTO members or 
involved in accession to the WTO. Table 5 lists wheat and rice state trading importers and
designates their WTO status. An agreement through the WTO that imposes disciplines on state
trading could have an impact on a number of the countries who continue to maintain wheat and
rice state trading enterprises. Economic researchers anticipate that the prevalent use of state
trading for a wide range of agricultural commodities makes it unlikely that agreement could be
reached on an outright ban on state trading (Miner 1998; Josling 1998). One avenue to address
many of the issues presented by state traders is competition policy. Due to the complexity of the
issues involved in competition policy and the divergent starting positions of WTO members,
WTO progress on competition policy may require several years. Other options that have beenPrevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 19 
proposed are to gradually increase the minimum access provisions or to obligate the countries
maintaining STEs to purchasing a minimum amount from the world market, comparable to Japan
and South Korea’s current obligations under the URAA (Josling 1998; Miner 1998). Miner
(1998) also proposes that importing STEs could remove their monopoly powers and allocate a
share of tariff rate quotas and import requirements to the private sector. Failing that outcome, he
suggests that importing STES be required to provide sufficient information to indicate that they
are meeting their obligations.
Table 5.  Countries Maintaining Rice or Wheat State Trading Importing Enterprises
























* STE in flux. 
It is difficult to gauge the likelihood that these disciplines will be accepted. Some
developing countries do not support further trade liberalization under the WTO. India has
expressed opposition to further reform, arguing that developing countries have not gained from
the Uruguay Round and that the URAA only deals with issues of importance to developed
countries (Bridges 1999; WTO 1999). India is the leader of a group of developing countries
concerned with representing the interests of developing countries in the WTO. 
Table 5 lists countries who are not WTO members, including Cuba, Iran, Libya, North
Korea, and Iraq. These countries are not well integrated into the world economy and operate
outside of the international institutions most likely to motivate changes in policy. Generally
speaking, these governments have not moved to a market-based model for their economies and 20 Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 
are not likely to do so in the near future. For these reasons, reform of state trading in these
countries is improbable. Although state trading has declined significantly over the past ten years,
it is unlikely to disappear altogether in world food grain markets.
Conclusions
Government intervention in wheat and rice trade through state trading has declined
significantly in the last fifteen years. An important catalyst of reform was structural adjustment
programs through the World Bank. The financial difficulties faced by the country receiving aid,
and the assistance offered by the World Bank, provided a strong incentive for countries to
participate.
However, World Bank analysts state when discussing good practices that “... public
enterprise reform in agriculture, as elsewhere, is a political process.  In working toward such
reform it is important to avoid a deadlock of the proposed reforms by assessing and reacting to
the political forces affecting them” (Meerman 1997, p. 6).  Meerman states that the Bank often
overestimates the borrower's ownership of the proposed reform, and that lack of government
commitment to reform is responsible for a substantial portion of failed programs (Meerman
1997, p. 7). Another World Bank report on Africa (World Bank 1993) argues that there is a need
to rethink adjustment policies that have seen less success and consensus, including practices for
public enterprise reform. 
Further reform of STEs through WTO negotiations are likely to encounter difficulties
similar to those faced by the World Bank, including resistance by a number of governments to
reform of their institutions.  In addition, the incentives provided by financial crises and World
Bank aid will not be present. It may be challenging to provide a package of trade reforms through
the WTO attractive enough to muster support from these countries. However, this analyst is
unwilling to draw conclusions about the willingness to reform on the part of such a diverse group
of countries.
This paper attempted to illustrate the long history that STEs have had in a number of
countries, the diversity that exists between them, as well as points of commonality. Further work
understanding the position taken by governments on their STEs, as well as their underlying
interests, may be a fruitful avenue to assist the process of WTO negotiations.Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 21 
References
Abbott, P. C. and L. M. Young. Wheat-importing state trading enterprises: Impacts on the
world wheat market. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, forthcoming.
 
Ban, S. H., P. Yong Moon and D. H. Perkins. 1982. Studies in the Modernization of the
Republic of Korea: 1945–1975 Rural Development. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
 
Bhatia, S. 1991. Agricultural Price Policy and Production in India (1956–90). Delhi: Konark
Publishers.
Brandão, A. and J. Carvalho. 1991. Brazil in the Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing
Policy, Volume 1, Latin America: (A World Bank Comparative Study), edited by Anne O.
Krueger, Maurice Schiff and Alberto Valdés. The World Bank. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
 
Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest. 1999. WTO: Voices speak out in favor of a re-balancing
new round and against further liberalization. 3(18).
 
Bruton, H. J. 1998. A reconsideration of import substitution. Journal of Economic Literature
36(June):903–936.
Choi, Jung-Sup, D. Sumner and J. H. Song. 1998. Importing STEs in Korea and Japan:
Evolution, operation and implications. Paper presented at the conference The Role of the
State in Agricultural Trade, Stanford University, Nov 19–21.
 
Cochrane, W. and M. Ryan. 1976. American Farm Policy: 1948–1973. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
 
Dixit, P. and T. Josling. 1997. State trading in agriculture: An analytical framework.
International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium Working Paper 97-4, July.
Duncan, A. and S. Jones. 1993. Agricultural marketing and pricing reform: A review of
experience. World Development 21(9):1495–1514.
 
Economic Research Service. 1998. Agriculture in the WTO. Situation and Outlook Series,
WRS-98-4, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., December.
 
Economic Research Service. 1999. Production, Supply, and Demand (PS&D) View. U.S. Dept.
of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.  22 Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 
Falcon, W. P. and E. A. Monke. 1979–1980. International trade in rice. Food Research Institute
Studies 17(3):279–304.
Gupta, A. 1998. Postcolonial Developments: Agriculture in the Making of Modern India.
London: Duke University Press.
Hoh, R. 1998. Personal communication, Agricultural Specialist, Foreign Agricultural Service,
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, July 10. 
Honma, M. and Y. Hayami. 1985. Structure of agricultural protection in industrial countries.
Journal of International Economics 20(1-2):115–29.
Hufbauer, G. and J. Schott. 1994. Western Hemisphere Economic Integration. Washington,
D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
IATRC (International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium). 1994. The Uruguay Round
Agreement on Agriculture: An Evaluation. Commissioned Paper Number 9, International
Agricultural Trade Research Consortium, July.
Jayarajah, C. and W. Branson. 1995. Structural and sectoral adjustment: World Bank
experience, 1980–92. Operations Evaluation Department, The World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
 
Josling, T. 1998. State trading and the WTO: Agricultural trade policy aspects. Paper presented
at the conference The Role of the State in Agricultural Trade, Stanford University,
November 19–21.
 
Kostecki, M. M. 1982. State trading in agricultural products by the advanced countries. In State
Trading in International Markets, edited by M. M. Kostecki. London: Macmillan Press.
 
Knudson, O. and J. Nash. 1990. Redefining the role of government in agriculture in the 1990s.
World Bank Discussion Paper 105, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
 
McCalla, A. F. 1994. Agriculture and food needs to 2025: Why we should be concerned. Sir
John Crawford Memorial Lecture. Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research, CGIAR Secretariat. The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Meerman, J. 1997. Reforming agriculture: The World Bank goes to market. A World Bank
Operations Evaluation Study. The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
 
Miner, B. 1998. Reforming the WTO rules on state trading for agriculture. Paper presented at
the conference The Role of the State in Agricultural Trade, Stanford University, Nov
19–21.
 Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 23 
Mosley, P., J. Harrigan and J. Toye. 1991. Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-Based
Lending. Volume 2. Case Studies. London: Routledge.
  Operations Evaluation Department. 1990. Agricultural marketing: The World Bank’s
experience 1974–85. The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
 
Restrepo, A. 1998. Personal communication. Agricultural Specialist, Foreign Agricultural
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bogotá, Colombia, September 3.
 
Schmitz, A., A. McCalla, D. Mitchell and C. Carter. 1981. Grain Export Cartels. Cambridge, 
Mass: Ballinger Press.
Sorenson, V. L. 1991. The economics and institutional dimension of state trading. In State
Trading in International Agricultural Markets: Institutional Dimensions and Selected
Cases, edited by L. Vernon et al. Washington, D.C.: International Council on Agriculture
and Trade, December.
Stein, H. ed. 1995. Asian Industrialization and Africa: Studies into Policy Alternatives and
Structural Adjustment. New York: St. Martin's Press.
 
Timmer, C. 1989. Food price policy: The rationale for government intervention. Food Policy 
14(1):17–42.
USTR (United States Trade Representative). 1997. 1997 National Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers, Washington, D.C.
USTR (United States Trade Representative). 1998. Preparations for the 1999 WTO
Ministerial General Council discussion on mandated negotiations and the built-in agenda:
Submission from the United States of America. Http://www.ustr.gov. November 23.
 
van der Eng, P. 1996. Agricultural Growth in Indonesia: Productivity Change and Policy
Impact Since 1880. London: MacMillan Press.
Veeman, M., M. Fulton and B. Larue. 1999. International trade in agricultural and food
products: The role of state trading enterprises. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada,
Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate Policy Branch. Ottawa, April.
 
Williamson, J. ed. 1994. The Political Economy of Policy Reform. Institute for International
Economics, Washington, D.C.
World Bank. 1994. Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead. World Bank
Policy Research Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
World Bank. 1997. World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World. The
World Bank. New York: Oxford University Press.  24 Prevalence and Reform of State Trading Importers in World Grain Markets 
World Trade Organization. 1999. Seattle preparations enter new phase. Focus
37(January–February).